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Book Review

The Corporate Criminal: Why
Corporations Must Be Abolished by Steve
Tombs and David Whyte
1

JOAN BROCKMAN2
STEVE TOMBS AND DAVID WHYTE provide an excellent indictment of the harms

caused by corporate crime and call for the abolition of corporations. I will focus
on three aspects of their argument: (1) Corporations are “a gross manipulation
of the free market;”3 (2) the state is “bystander, facilitator and even conspirator
in corporate crime;”4 and (3) borrowing from Frank Pearce (to whom the book
is dedicated), corporations are a “form of structural irresponsibility.”5 This review
then turns to some of the solutions proposed by the authors.
Corporations, governments, and the media often describe the corporation
as the best means of distributing goods and services, and balancing economic
progress with the demands of social welfare. However, proliferating oligopolies
in all areas of production and distribution illustrate that corporations are “a
gross manipulation of the free market.”6 According to the authors, mergers assist
corporations in raising prices; if there are any efficiencies, they are not passed
on to consumers. Claims of efficiency also ignore the fact that corporations are,
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

(Oxford: Routledge, 2015).
Professor, School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University.
Tombs & White, supra note 1 at 12.
Ibid at 54.
Ibid at 114, citing Frank Pearce, “Corporate Rationality as Corporate Crime” (1993) 40
Stud Pol Econ 135.
Tombs & Whyte, supra note 1 at 12.
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borrowing from Joel Bakan’s The Corporation,7 externalizing machines. According
to Tombs and Whyte, costs are inflicted upon workers and the public (through
death and disease) or socialized (left behind for the taxpayers to clean up). We
see evidence of this in Canada with the numerous abandoned mining and oil
extraction sites left to contaminate the air, water, and surrounding land.8 Even
when corporations are required to pre-pay for their environmental harms,
governments are still left picking up the costs when such funds are insufficient.
For example, during the 2009 downturn in the oil and gas business, the Alberta
government topped up the Orphan Well Association’s9 fund by $30 million.10
The fact that corporate pollution is usually conducted under regulatory permits
supports Tombs and Whyte’s assertion that the state is an active participant in
corporate harms.
The authors provide examples of corporate-state collusion and crime, going
back to the East India Company’s use of torture, decapitation, and live burning
of competitors to dominate international trade.11 In 1935, Brigadier General
Smedley S. Butler estimated that the First World War created 21,000 new American
millionaires and billionaires, and this was probably an under-representation, as

7.

Ibid at 15, citing Joel Bakan, The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power
(New York: Free Press, 2004).
8. See, for example, the environmental damage caused by the Giant Mine near Yellowknife and
the estimated $900 million clean-up cost which will be funded by the federal government;
the estimated cost of cleaning up all of the abandoned mines is in the billions. See Staff,
“16x9: Taxpayers will foot the bill for cleaning up contaminated sites” (22 November 2014),
online: Global News <globalnews.ca/news/1687225/16x9-taxpayers-will-foot-the-billfor-cleaning-up-contaminated-sites/>; Arn Keeling & John Sandlos, “The Toxic Legacies
Project,” online: <www.abandonedminesnc.com/?page_id=470>. The Treasury Board of
Canada lists federal contaminated sites and plans (or not) to clean them. See Government
of Canada, Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, “Federal Contaminated Sites Inventory,”
online: <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/fcsi-rscf/home-accueil-eng.aspx>.
9. “List of Orphan Wells” (2003), online: <http://www.orphanwell.ca/pg_orphan_well_list.
html>.The Orphan Well Association in Alberta is a delegated administrative organization
that operates under the authority of the Alberta Energy Regulator to manage abandoned
upstream oil and gas wells and pipelines in Alberta. As of 26 August 2015, it recorded a total
of 695 orphan wells to be abandoned within the next six months and 503 reclamation sites.
“Problem wells under long term care and custody are excluded” from these lists (ibid). The
most expensive orphan expenditure was over $21 million.
10. Terry Reith & Briar Stewart, “Alberta faces growing backlog of abandoned oil
and gas wells: Millions needed to clean up sites and mitigate environmental
risk” (14 July 2015), online: CBC News <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/
alberta-faces-growing-backlog-of-abandoned-oil-and-gas-wells-1.3150012>.
11. Tombs & Whyte, supra note 1 at 56.
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only those that accurately reported their income were counted.12 The Nazis could
not have waged their aggressive war throughout Europe without the aid of US
oil and gas companies; Swiss banks facilitated theft of property; General Motors
manufactured German tanks; ITT ran Hitler’s telecommunication system,
operated air craft factories for the Nazis, and provided bombs; and Standard
Oil (now Exxon) joined with a Nazi firm (IG Farben) to carve up the oil and
chemical market.13 More recent examples include ITT in Chile, providing
money to destabilize the government and $1 million USD to the CIA to assist.
Over 200 “western firms from 21 countries [were] implicated in the production
of chemicals and missile parts sold to Iraq for illegal poison gas and nerve gas
warfare.”14 According to Tombs and Whyte, some of these crimes lack public
exposure, but others are so over-exposed that they are normalized.
The state is also implicated in the laws it creates and how it does (or does
not) enforce them. Sutherland introduced the concept of white-collar crime in
the early 1940s to draw attention to the fact that corporate and other white-collar
criminals are subject to differential enforcement through administrative
segregation so that their crimes are treated as accidents and governed by
administrative and regulatory actions, not the criminal law.15 When corporate
criminals enter the criminal justice system, they are treated with leniency because
judges and administrators are “either subject to the material ideological influence
of business-people, or share their ideological and/or cultural world views.”16 The
authors also highlight Karl Marx’s documentation of factory conditions in the
1800s and the need for legislation to offer some protection for mutilated and
short-lived children (the compliant labour force), on whom factory owners relied
for their profits.
The authors examine contemporary regulatory failures and dismiss
three out of four models for understanding corporate regulation: consensus,
12. Ibid at 55.
13. Ibid at 61.
14. Ibid at 63. For a discussion of the use of private security firms in foreign wars and commerce,
see e.g. Lindsey Cameron & Vincent Chetail, Privatizing War: Private Military and Security
Companies under Public international Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2I13);
Scott Fitzsimmons, Private Security Companies in the Iraq War: Military Culture and the
Use of Deadly Force (New York: Routledge, 2016); Scott Fitzsimmons, “Wheeled Warriors:
Explaining Variations in the use of Violence by Private Security Companies in Iraq” (2013)
22:4 Sec Stud 707; Craig Forcese, “Deterring ‘Militarized Commerce’: The Prospect of
Liability for ‘Privatized’ Human Rights Abuses” (1999-2000) 31:2 Ottawa L Rev 171.
15. Tombs & Whyte, supra note 1 at 132.
16. Ibid at 133, citing Edwin Sutherland, “Is ‘White-Collar Crime’ Crime?” (1944) 10:2 Am Soc
Rev 132 at 137.
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neo-liberal, and captive theory. First, the consensus model of regulation (along
with the compliance school of regulation and Braithwaite’s flexible pyramid of
enforcement) is dismissed because there is little evidence to support the claim
that self-regulation works. The consensus model downplays inherent conflicts in
regulation, ignores worker and public protests, and allows corporations to bypass
the rules by creative compliance and law avoidance. The second model, the
neo-liberal understanding of government regulation, states that there is too much
regulation and that we ought to leave regulation to market forces. Corporations
will have to pay whatever the market bears and provide enough safety so that
workers are prepared to engage in dangerous employment. According to Tombs
and Whyte, the institutionalization of deregulation, the elimination of red tape,
and the removal of resources for worker safety and consumer protection fail to
take into account the externalization of costs—that is, the costs of production
in terms of lives, injuries, and pollution are all socialized. The workers and
citizens pay with their health and their lives, the taxpayers pick up the costs,
and corporations walk away with the profits. The third model, a spinoff from
neo-liberalism, is the law and economics movement and its capture theory.
According to this model, government regulators may start off as zealous, but
they are later captured and manipulated by big business. The theory is useful in
explaining how governments facilitate corporate crime, but fails, according to
Tombs and Whyte, to explain why the government sometimes imposes stricter
regulation that might harm corporate profits.
None of the above models account for resistance and the various social forces
at work when regulations are produced and enforced, or not enforced. A fourth
perspective, which emerges from critical and neo-Marxist research, examines
conflict (“dissensus”), not consensus in the development and enforcement of
legislation. The authors look at the thirteen-year campaign that resulted in the
UK Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act in 2008 during a time
of de-regulation. Given that the Institute of Directors was successful in lobbying
the government of the United Kingdom to protect managers from prosecution,
it is easy to see why the lobbyists for the legislation were critical of it. It is more
difficult to understand why Tombs and Whyte view it as a success. The authors
cite Steven Bittle’s book, Still Dying for a Living: Corporate Criminal Liability
After the Westray Mine Disaster,17 as another example of the dissensus that goes
into legislation aimed at prohibiting corporate crime. At least in this Canadian
example, the legislation allowed for the prosecution of managers. According
to Tombs and Whyte, regulation is more about making sure the corporate
17. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012).
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economy does not self-destruct (maintaining the existing social order) than
about controlling corporate power. Therefore, regulation can never be a solution
to corporate crime. Once regulations are in place, their enforcement is open to
negotiation and neglect.
In agreement with Paddy Ireland,18 the authors assert that the driving force
behind the modern corporation was not economic efficiency but demands
for investment opportunities by the growing British bourgeois class who had
accumulated enormous surplus wealth. Limited liability (initially referred to as
“limited responsibility”19) shielded investors from any losses over and above their
investment. Corporations created subsidiaries so they too could take advantage of
limited liability. Corporations also benefitted from the requirement of mens rea to
establish criminal liability, as most corporate crime was the result of indifference
to safety, not intentional harm. Judges were often unable or unwilling to find
a directing mind (a requirement of the “identification doctrine”) in order to
convict a corporation. The introduction of strict liability and a regulatory regime
further removed the corporation from the realm of “real” crime, and the harm it
caused was socially constructed as accidents or mistakes.20
The separation of ownership (shareholders) from management results in
shareholders blaming managers, and managers justifying their actions on the
basis of what is good for the corporation (minimizing costs and making profits).
Shares depersonalize ownership, and owners have less of a commitment to the
company. As Berle and Means wrote in 1932, the shares “glide from hand to
hand, irresponsible and impersonal.”21 Shareholders expect to participate in the
profit of a corporation but feel no responsibility for the harms caused to make
that profit. Frank Pearce called this a “form of structural irresponsibility”22—
shareholders come and go, simply interested in their investments. Corporations
contract out their work and create subsidiaries which further isolate them from
responsibility and liability. The authors provide the example of Union Carbide
blaming its subsidiary Union Carbide India for the Bhopal disaster. And it was
18. Paddy Ireland, “Capitalism without the Capitalist: The Joint Stock Company share
and the Emergence of the Modern Doctrine of Separate Corporate Personality” (1996)
17:1 J Leg Hist 4.
19. Tombs & Whyte, supra note 1 at 140.
20. Ibid at 92.
21. Ibid at 112, citing Adolf A Berle, Jr & Gardiner C Means, The Modern Corporation and
Private Property (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932).
22. Ibid at 72, citing Frank Pearce, “Crime and Capitalist Business Organisations” in N Shover
and JP Wright, eds, Crimes of Privilege: Readings in White Collar Crime (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001) 35 at 45-46.
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this very arrangement that allowed the subsidiary to “drive conditions at the
Bhopal plant to an unacceptably dangerous level.”23 Accordingly, the corporate
veil, a term used to describe the law that limits shareholder liability to the shares
they have bought in the corporation, allows those who engage in evil to avoid
the consequences.
The Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)24 drive and the publicity
surrounding the good corporate citizen blur the line between corporations
and politics, presenting the notion that governments do not need to intervene.
These images provide corporations with a platform for their opposition to, and
sabotage of, any proposed legislation that might reign them in. According to
Tombs and Whyte, the rhetoric of CSR empowers corporations to take over
what were once public functions—education, transportation, health, and
welfare—and allows corporations to build consumer allegiance to secure
and extend profit-maximization. Corporations act in spaces within the law:
under-enforcement, negotiated penalties, minimalistic law-abiding behaviour,
and so on. Corporations also act in spaces between the law. They may follow
the rules in their own country, but they may also, for example, export hazardous
material and exploit workers in other countries. In this vein, one might ask why
we allow the importation of goods that are manufactured under conditions that
would be considered criminal in our country. In addition, the export of jobs to
lower bidding economies is having an impact on the economic well-being of
countries that facilitate such exportation.25
In their final chapter, Tombs and Whyte address the question, “What is to
be done about the corporate criminal?” In contrast to abolition, the government
solution is to reduce the “burden” on corporations. The authors provide an
example from the 2010 election in the United Kingdom—all three parties were
committed to reducing the cost of doing business and to entering the age of
austerity. The private sector would lead the way to recovery. The poison was
now the cure. Along with austerity budgets came further privatization of, and
23. Tombs & Whyte, ibid at 115.
24. The Government of Canada defines CSR as “the voluntary activities undertaken by a
company to operate in an economic, social and environmentally sustainable manner.” See
Global Affairs Canada, “Corporate Social Responsibility” (1 December 2015), online:
<http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/
other-autre/csr-rse.aspx?lang=eng>.
25. Mexican car manufacturing workers are paid 10% of what Canadian workers are paid,
draining jobs from Canada. See CBC News, News Release, “Carmakers say adios to Canada
as Mexico shifts into higher gear” (15 June 2015), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/
carmakers-say-adios-to-canada-as-mexico-shifts-into-higher-gear-1.3108148>.
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cutbacks to, public services, as well as mass unemployment, wage reduction,
workfare instead of welfare, and increasing inequality. According to Tombs and
Whyte, the privatization of government assets and services in England coincided
with re-regulation—often in the form of opaque contracts. The illusion is free
enterprise. The reality is “a complex web of (re) regulation.”26 Deregulation fails
to capture the fact that “corporate activity is always regulated by the state”27
in a non-antagonistic relationship of interdependence. Although delegating
public services to private corporations empowers corporations to cause further
harm (supported and underwritten by the state), the authors believe that
these state-supported harms create a risk to both the state and corporations.
The evidence shows that the private sector cannot deliver public services more
efficiently than public servants. Privatization provides tremendous opportunities
for corporate fraud on the government. For example, G4S and Serco, two large
private security firms, were fined for charging the government for electronically
“tagging offenders who were either in prison or dead.”28
Tombs and Whyte believe that these incidents of corporate crime subsidized
by the state (e.g., the 2008 bank bail-outs) result in increased corporate
vulnerability and state exposure, which can in turn lead to public demand for
change. On the transformative front (with the ultimate goal of abolishing the
corporation), they provide a number of examples: Occupy Wall Street and other
organizations’ call to end legal personhood for the corporation in the United
States and the movement (i.e., Move to Amend) to remove corporations from
constitutional protection.29
In terms of ‘non-reformist reforms’ that do not call for abolition, they suggest
increased liability on those who own and direct corporations, and they return to
Coffee’s30 1981 recommendation for equity fines (reiterated by Pearce in 199331)
whereby corporations are required to issue new shares to victims, trade unions, or
a state-controlled compensation fund. Tombs and Whyte report that a proposal
for equity fines was debated and rejected in Scotland in 2010.32
As an example of success, Tombs and Whyte identify campaigns against
shale oil fracking in the United Kingdom. Unfortunately, such success has not
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Supra note 1 at 23.
Ibid at 26.
Ibid at 171.
Ibid at 174.
John C Coffee, Jr “‘No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick’: An Unscandalized Inquiry Into the
Problem of Corporate Punishment” (1981) 79 Mich L Rev 386 at 413-24.
31. Supra note 5 at 149.
32. Supra note 1 at 175.
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been imported into British Columbia. While I read this book in July 2015, the
BC government met at a special session in Victoria to pass legislation that would
bind the province to a twenty-five year liquid natural gas (LNG) contract with a
consortium led by Petronas, a Malaysian company. The contract would require
the BC government to compensate the consortium if future governments raised
income tax rates or carbon tax on the industry, reduced natural gas tax credits,
or changed laws regarding greenhouse emissions that financially harmed the
industry.33 The harms caused by fracking to water, land, livestock, and people, as
well as the reduction in the land’s availability for more sustainable uses, were not
highly visible in the media. Neither was the scientific link between fracking for
LNG and earthquakes. In fact, most of the students in my Summer 2015 seminar
on Corporate Financial Crimes and Misconduct were unfamiliar with fracking.
Even though regulations can never “tame private capital,”34 Tombs and
Whyte believe that the regulation of corporations is worth pursing because
at times it successfully disrupts capital and benefits workers, consumers, and
local residents. Regulation can also undermine the absolute power of managers
to do as they please and can sometimes mitigate the unequal distribution of
harm. Empowering organized labour, local communities, activist groups, and
whistle-blowers can put limits on corporate power and alleviate corporate harm.
What they appear to be saying is, effectively, if you do not like what is happening,
then you will have to do something about it; you cannot rely on government to
act without very loud and decisive direction by the public, organized workers,
community groups, parents, students, environmental groups, whistle-blowers,
and so on. The book is a call for action.
Although the authors do an excellent job of indicting the corporation, they
fall short on where we go from here. Their claim that they are not providing
a “blue print for a future utopia” or a “political manifesto”35 does not fit well
with the expectation that those who start a revolution should provide an action
plan. If limited liability (i.e., responsibility) is the essence of the problem and
serves no useful purpose other than to shield those who enter the casino world of

33. Jason Proctor, “B.C. Legislature debates law on 25-year LNG deal:
Unprecedented agreement would give industry relief from LNG-targeted tax
increases” (13 July 2015), online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/
british-columbia/b-c-legislature-debates-law-on-25-year-lng-deal-1.3147535>.
34. Tombs & Whyte, supra note 1 at 177.
35. Ibid at 179.
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the stock market, why not start with double liability,36 then triple liability, until
limited responsibility is removed?37 Such liability could easily be imposed in the
same manner as the often proposed, but rejected, equity fine. If, for example, the
clean-up cost of an oil spill is $1 billion, the corporation would be required to
issue $1 billion worth of shares to an entity such as an independent administrative
agency. A $1 billion equity fine could be imposed in a similar manner—by
payment in shares. In addition, a social reconstruction of limited liability that
returns us to the concept of limited responsibility might also assist in redirecting
the public’s attention to the essence of what is wrong with the corporation.
The Corporate Criminal is reminiscent of Frank Pearce’s 1993 article
“Corporate Rationality as Corporate Crime.”38 The authors provide examples of
devastating corporate crime and harm, followed by the role that law plays, the
lack of enforcement, privileging investors with limited liability, out-of-control
managers, a replication of Kreisberg’s ideal types of how the corporation operates,
the role of the state, and sites for struggles to control the corporation. Pearce laid
much of the groundwork for implicating the corporation. Others (e.g., Bakan,39
Bittle,40 Glasbeek,41 Hutchinson,42 and Slapper and Tombs43) have done the same,
with varying solutions. It is time to take the next step. I look forward to a sequel
that provides a road map for how corporations can be abolished.

36. For a discussion of double liability in 19th century (where shareholders were liable for a
share’s unpaid value plus the value of the share), see RCB Risk, “The Nineteenth-Century
Foundations of the Business Corporation in Ontario” (1973) 23:3 UTLJ 270 at 295-97.
37. A number of writers have suggested a return to unlimited liability in various forms. See
e.g. Paddy Ireland, “Limited Liability, Shareholder Rights and the Problem of Corporate
Irresponsibility” (2010) 34:5 Cambridge J Econ 837. Indeed, unlimited liability corporations
do exist. See e.g. Mohamed F. Khimji, “Shareholder Liability in Nova Scotia Unlimited
Companies” (2014) 37:2 Dal LJ 787. In addition, some provinces allow lawyers and other
professionals to incorporate unlimited liability corporations.
38. Supra note 5.
39. Supra note 7.
40. Supra note 17.
41. Harry Glasbeek, Wealth by Stealth: Corporate Crime, Corporate Law, and the Perversion of
Democracy (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2002).
42. Allan C Hutchinson, The Companies We Keep: Corporate Governance for a Democratic Society
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005).
43. Gary Slapper & Steve Tombs, Corporate Crime (Essex, UK: Pearson Education, 1999).

